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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
locate just what has altered and how" (Geertz 1995:2) . This is the challenge of the ethnographic revisit: to disentangle movements of the external world from the researcher's own shifting involvement with that same world, all the while recognizing that the two are not independent.
With their detailed ethnographic revisits to classic sites, the earlier anthropologists tended toward realism, focusing on the dynamic properties of the world they studied, whereas more recently they have increasingly veered in a constructivist direction in which the ethnographer becomes the central figure. They have found it hard to steer a balanced course. On the other hand, sociologist-ethnographers, grounded theorists in particular, have simply ducked the challenge altogether. Too often they remain trapped in the contemporary, riveted to and contained in their sites, from where they bracket questions of historical change, social process, wider contexts, theoretical traditions, as well as their own relation to the people they study. While sociology in general has taken a historical turn-whether as a deprovincializing aid to social theory or as an analytical comparative history with its own mission, whether as historical demography or longitudinal survey research-ethnography has been slow to emancipate itself from the eternal present. My purpose here is to encourage and consolidate what historical interest there exists within sociology-as-ethnography, transporting it from its unconscious past into a historicized world by elaborating the notion of ethnography-as-revisit. This, in turn, lays the foundations for a reflexive ethnography.1 Let me define my terms. An ethnographic revisit occurs when an ethnographer undertakes participant observation, that is, studying others in their space and time, with a view to comparing his or her site with the same one studied at an earlier point in time, whether by him or herself or by someone else. This is to be distinguished from an ethnographic reanalysis, which involves the interrogation of an already existing ethnography without any further field work. Colignon's (1996) critical reexamination and reinterpretation of Selznick's (1949) TVA and the Grassroots or Franke and Kaul's (1978) reexamination of the Hawthorne studies are both examples of reanalyses. A revisit must also be distinguished from an ethnographic update, which brings an earlier study up to the present but does not reengage it. Hollingshead's (1975) empirical account of changes in Elmstown is an update because it does not seriously engage with the original study. Gans (1982) updates The Urban Villagers, not so much by adding new field data as by addressing new literatures on class and poverty. These are not hard and fast distinctions, but they nonetheless guide my choice of the ethnographic revisits I examine in this paper.
There is one final but fundamental distinction-that between revisit and replication. Ethnographers perennially face the criticism that their research is not trans-personally replicable-that one ethnographer will view the field differently from another.2 To strive for replicability in this constructivist sense is to strip ourselves of our prejudices, biases, theories, and so on before entering the field and to minimize the impact of our presence once we are in the field. Rather than dive into the pool fully clothed, we stand naked on the side. With the revisit we believe the contrary: There is no way of seeing clearly without a theoretical lens, just as there is no passive, neutral position. The revisit demands that we be self-conscious and deliberate about the theories we employ and that we capitalize on the effects of our interventions. There is also, however, a second meaning of replication that concerns not controlling conditions of research, but testing the robustness of findings. We replicate a study in order to show that the findings hold across the widest variety of cases, that -to use one of Hughes's (1958) examples-the need to deal with dirty work applies as much to physicians as janitors. Replication means searching for similarity across difference. When we revisit, however, our purpose is not to seek constancy across two encounters but to understand and explain variation, in particular to comprehend difference over time.
In short, the ethnographic revisit champions what replication strives, in vain, to repress. Where replication is concerned with minimizing intervention to control research conditions and with maximizing the diversity of cases to secure the constancy of findings, the purpose of the revisit is the exact opposite: to focus on the inescapable dilemmas of participating in the world we study, on the necessity of bringing theory to the field, all with a view to developing explanations of historical change. As we shall see, to place the revisit rather than replication at the center of ethnography is to re-envision ethnography's connection to social science and to the world it seeks to comprehend.
WHAT SOCIOLOGY CAN LEARN FROM ANTHROPOLOGY
Anthropologists routinely revisit their own sites and those of others, or reanalyze canonical works, while sociologist-ethnographers seldom revisit their own sites, let alone those of their forbears. Even reanalyses are rare. Why should the two disciplines differ so dramatically? It is worth considering a number of mundane hypotheses, if only to dispel disciplinary stereotypes. The first hypothesis, as to why anthropologists are so fond of revisits, is that field work has long been a tradition in their discipline, and they have accumulated, therefore, a vast stock of classic studies to revisit. Ethnography is so new to sociology that there are few worthy classic studies to revisit. This hypothesis doesn't stand up to scrutiny, though, as sociologists have been doing systematic field work almost as long as anthropologists. Franz Boas began his first field work among the Kwakiutl in 1886, only a little more than a decade before Du Bois ([1899] 1996) worked on The Philadelphia Negro. Bronislaw Malinowski first set out for the Trobriand Islands in 1915, and at the same time Thomas and Znaniecki (1918-1920) were collecting data for their The Polish Peasant in Europe and America.
A second hypothesis might turn the analytic eye to the present. Anthropologists, having conquered the world, can now only revisit old sites (or study themselves). As in the case of archeologists there are only so many sites to excavate. Sociologists, on the other hand, have so many unexplored sites to cultivate, even in their own backyards, that they have no need to retread the old. This second hypothesis doesn't work either, especially now that anthropologists have spread into advanced capitalism where they compete with sociologists (Susser and Patterson 2001). Moreover, sociologists are always returning to the same places to do their ethnographies, but rarely, it would seem, to revisit. That is, generations of sociologists have studied Chicago, but never, or almost never, have they systematically compared their field work with that of a predecessor.
This brings me to a third, rather bleak, hypothesis: that the early ethnographies in sociology were so poorly done, so ad hoc, that they are not worth revisiting! I hope to disabuse the reader of this idea by the time I have finished. Sociologists have been quite capable of superbly detailed ethnography, just as anthropologists can be guilty of sloppy field work. Moreover, flawed field work does not discourage revisits, but, as we shall see, it often stimulates them! A fourth hypothesis is that the worlds studied by early sociologist-ethnographers have changed so dramatically that the sites are unrecognizable, whereas anthropological sites are more enduring. This, too, does not make sense. Hutchinson's (1996) Nuerland has been invaded, colonized, and beset by civil war since Evans-Pritchard was there in the 1930s, but that did not stop her using Evans-Pritchard as a baseline to understand the impact of decolonization, war, Christian-ity, and transnational capital. Similarly, Colson (1971) followed the Gwembe Tonga after they had been displaced by flooding from the Kariba Dam. Sociological sites, on the other hand, are not all demolished. To be sure urban renewal overtook Herbert Gans's West End (Gans 1982 ), but Whyte's North End (Whyte 1943 ) is still recognizable despite the changes it has sustained. The drama of change and the dissolution of old sites do become factors in revisits, but this does not distinguish the anthropologist from the ethnographer-sociologist.
If it is not the nature of the site being studied then perhaps the distinction lies with the observer-the anthropologist's romance with the past or the sociologist's attachment to the present. One does not have to resort to such an essentialist and unlikely psychology. One might simply argue that anthropologists invest so much in their research site-learning the language, the practices, rituals, and so on-that they are drawn back to their own sites rather than driven to excavate new ones. But this fifth hypothesis doesn't explain the anthropologist's relish for studying other people's sites, revisiting other people's studies.
Perhaps the answer lies with the disciplinary projects of anthropology and sociology. So my sixth hypothesis is that anthropologists have been trained to study the "other" as exotic (or they came to anthropology with this in mind) and they are therefore more reflexive-more likely to ask who they are and where they came from. Sociologists, because they study the familiar (i.e., their own society), are less reflexive, less likely to think about themselves and their traditions. But here too the difference is not clear-sociologists have a trained capacity to exoticize those they study, as though they come from a different world, even if they are next-door neighbors. Indeed, some would say that was their craft-making the normal abnormal and then making it normal again! Still, in turning to the discipline for an explanation, I think one may be getting nearer the mark. Ethnography in American sociology has followed a twisted road. It began as the dominant approach in the field when the Chicago School prevailed, but with the spread of sociology and the expansion of the university, it succumbed to the twin forces of survey research and structural functionalism-what Mills (1959) Forced to carve out its own "scientific" niche, participant observation turned inward. To put their best positivist foot forward, participant observers (1) pretended to be neutral insiders and thus silencing the ways field workers are irrevocably implicated in the world they study, (2) repressed preexisting theory as a dangerous contamination, (3) sometimes even eclipsed processual change in the search for singular descriptions of micro-situations, and (4) suspended as unknowable the historical and macro-context of the micro-analysis.3 In studying ethnographic revisits I will provide correctives along all four dimensions-thematizing (1) the observer as participant, (2) the reconstruction of theory, (3) internal processes, and (4) external forces-thereby establishing the four principles of reflexive ethnography.4
My criticism of sociologist-ethnographers should not be misunderstood. There is much be studied and gleaned from the present. The long tradition of community studies, dominated by the Chicago School, has made enormous contributions to our understanding of urban life. The symbolic interactionists and the ethnomethodologists have deployed participant observation to great advantage, sustaining this marginal technique in face of the ascendancy of quantitative research. As an embattled minority, participant observers insulated themselves both from changes in the discipline and from changes in the world. Today, when historical sociology is mainstream, when grand theory is no longer so imperial, when survey research is itself increasingly concerned with longitudinal analysis, when globalization is the topic of the day, participant observation should come out from its protected corner to embrace history, context, and theory.5 In this project sociologists have much to learn from anthropologists, from both their insights and their oversights: Anthropologists offer an inspiration but also a warning, Within anthropology the trajectory of ethnography has been very different. Its canonical texts were ethnographic. Just as sociology returns again and again to Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, so anthropology has returned to Boas, Mead, Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard, Radcliffe-Brown, and the rest-and will continue to do so as long as they define the anthropological tradition. When the very possibility of ethnography was threatened by anticolonial revolts, anthropology reverberated in shock. Acknowledging how dependent they were on forces they no longer controlled, anthropologists willy-nilly became exceedingly conscious of the world beyond their field site. They revisited (and reanalyzed) the innocent studies that were their canon and that, so often, had been conducted under the protective guardianship of colonialism-conditions that remained silent in the original studies. The isolation of the village, of the tribe, was a conjuring act that depended on the coercive presence of a colonial administration (Asad 1973) . Simultaneous with this heightened historical consciousness came a questioning of the anthropological theories that emerged from these hitherto unstated conditions, and of the way their texts already contained within them particular relations of colonial domination (Clifford and Marcus 1986). Thus, history, theory, and context came to be deeply impressed upon the anthropologist's sensibility Comaroff 1991, 1992; Mintz 1985; Vincent 1990; Wolf 1982) .
While the anthropologist was thrown into a turbulent world order, the sociologist-ethnographer retreated into secure enclaves in both the discipline and the community. The sociologists threw up false boundaries around their sites to ward off accusations that they did not practice "science," while the anthropologists forsook science as they opened the floodgates of world history. Once the ex-colonial subject was released from anthropological confinement and allowed to traverse the world, the trope of revisit became as natural to the practice of the anthropology as it was to the movements of its subjects. Taken-for-granted by the anthropologist, it takes a sociologist to exhume the significance and variety of revisits.
In the remainder of this essay, I design a framework to critically appropriate the classic revisits of anthropology and to bring sociology-as-ethnography out of its dark ages.
Blum et al. 2000)
. Reflexive ethnography and the extended case method, however, differ in their emphases. The extended case method stresses the augmentation of social processes studied through participant observation with external forces and the reconstruction of theory; reflexive ethnography stresses the dialogue between constructivism (observer as participant and reconstructing theory) and realism (internal processes and external forces). In other words, the extended case method and reflexive ethnography share the same four constitutive elements, but these elements are brought into a different relation with each other.
5 At least in one area ethnography has embraced history, theory, and context. The ethnography of science began as a reaction to grand Mertonian claims about the normative foundations of scientific knowledge. It then turned to the daily practice of laboratory life (Latour and Woolgar 1979)-a resolutely micro-analysis drawing on strains of ethnomethodology. These laboratory studies then relocated themselves in the wider context that shaped science and its history, but without losing their ethnographic foundations (Epstein 1996; Fujimura 1996; Latour 1988 ).
DISSECTING THE FOCUSED REVISIT-MANUFACTURING CONSENT
Revisits come in different types. However, the most comprehensive is the focused revisit, which entails an intensive comparison of one's own field work with a prior ethnography of the same site, usually conducted by someone else. Like the focused interview before it (Merton, Fiske, and Kendall 1956), the focused revisit takes as its point of departure an already investigated situation, but one that takes on very different meanings because of changes in historical context and the interests and perspectives of the revisitor.
The scheme of focused revisits I develop here derives from my own serendipitous revisit (Burawoy 1979 ) to a factory studied by Donald Roy, one of the great ethnographers of the Chicago School. Roy (1952a Roy ( , 1952b Roy ( , 1953 Roy ( , 1954 studied Geer Company in 1944-1945, and I studied that same factory 30 years later in 1974-1975, after it had become the engine division of Allied Corporation. Like Roy I was employed as a machine operator. For both of us it was a source of income as well as our dissertation field work. As I grew accustomed to the workplace, I was reminded of other piecework machine shops, not the least Roy's classic accounts of output restriction (Roy 1952a (Roy , 1953 (Roy , 1954 .6 There were the machine operators on piece rates, working at their radial drills, speed drills, mills, and lathes, while the auxiliary workers (inspectors, setup men, crib attendants, dispatchers, truck drivers) were on hourly rates. I observed the same piece work game of "making out" (making the piece rate), and the same patterns of output restriction, namely "goldbricking" (slowing down when piece rates were too difficult) or "quota restriction" (not busting rates when they were easy). In turning to Roy's (1952b) I painstakingly examined Roy's (1952b) dissertation and discovered, indeed, a series of small but significant changes in the factory. First, the old authoritarian relation between management and worker had dissipated. This change was marked by the disappearance of the "time and study men," who would clock operators' jobs when their backs were turned, in pursuit of piece rates 6 I was familiar with a number of other studies of piece rates that showed similar patterns of "output restriction" (see, esp., Lupton 1963 
OBSERVER AS PARTICIPANT
My first hypothesis is that Roy's and my experiences at Geer and Allied, respectively, differed because we had a different relation to the people we studied. After all, Roy was not new to blue-collar work like I was; he was a veteran of many industries. He was accepted by his fellow workers as I-an Englishman and a student to boot-could never be. Perhaps his blue-collar pride flared up more easily at managerial edicts; perhaps he could more effectively obtain the respect and, thus, the cooperation of auxiliary workers? Our divergent biographies and resulting habiti, therefore, might explain our different experiences, but so might our location in the workplace. I was a miscellaneous machine operator who could roam the shop floor with ease, while Roy was stuck to his radial drill. No wonder, one might conclude, he, more than I, experienced management as authoritarian. Finally, a third set of factors might have intervened-our embodiment as racialized or gendered subjects. Although many have criticized Manufacturing Consent (Burawoy 1979) for not giving weight to race and gender, it is not obvious that either were important for explaining the discrepancies between Roy's experiences and mine, as we were both white and male. Still, in my time whiteness might have signified something very different because, unlike Roy, I was working alongside African Americans. This racial moment may have disrupted lateral relations with other workers and bound me closer to white management.
I argue that none of these factors-neither habitus, location, nor embodiment-could explain the difference in our experience of work because both of us observed every other operator on the shop floor going through the same shared and common experience, regardless of their habitus, their location, or their race. Work was organized as a collective game, and each worker evaluated others as well as themselves in terms of "making out." We all played the same game and experienced its victories and defeats in the same way-at least that was what both Roy and myself gleaned from all the emotional talk around us.
RECONSTRUCTING THEORY
If it was not the different relations we had to those we studied that shaped our different experiences of work, perhaps it was the theory we each brought to the factory. Undoubtedly, we came to the shop floor with different theories. Roy was a dissident within the human relations school. He argued against the findings of the Western Electric Studies that restriction of output was the product of workers failing to understand the rules of economic rationality. To the contrary, Roy argued, workers understood economic rationality much better than management, which was always putting obstacles in the way of their "making out"-obstacles operators cleverly circumvented in order to meet managerial expectations without compromising their own economic interests. If rates were impossible to make, workers would signal this by slowing down. If piece rates were easy, workers would be sure not to draw attention to the fact by rate busting for fear it would lead to rate cutting. Not workers, but management, it turned out, was being irrational by introducing counterproductive rules that impeded the free flow of work. Like Roy, I was a dissident, but within the Marxist tradition. I tried to demonstrate that the workplace, rather than the locus for the crystallization of class consciousness hostile to capitalism, was an arena for manufacturing consent. I showed how the political and ideological apparatuses of the state, so fondly theorized by Gramsci, Poulantzas, Miliband, Habermas, Althusser, and others, found their counterpart within production. It was here on the shop floor that I found the organization of class compromise and the constitution of the individual as an industrial citizen. Bor-rowing from Gramsci, I called this the "hegemonic organization of production," or the "hegemonic regime of production." If our theories were so different, could they explain our-Roy's and mine-different experiences of the workplace? Certainly different theories have different empirical foci, select different data. But at least in this case theoretical differences cannot explain why I experienced more lateral conflict and Roy more vertical conflict, why he battled with time and study men whereas in my time they were nowhere to be found. If theory alone were the explanation for our different accounts, then Allied Corporation would look the same as Geer Company if examined through the same theoretical lens. When I focus my theory of hegemony onto Geer Company, however, I discover a more despotic workplace than Allied, one that favors coercion over consent, with fewer institutions constituting workers as individuals or binding their interests to the company. Equally, were Roy to have trained his human relations lens on Allied he would have perceived a more participatory management culture. Whereas at Geer, workers were treated as "yardbirds," Allied's management expanded worker rights and extended more human respect, and in exchange obtained more worker cooperation. Differences remained, therefore, even as we each take our own theory to the workplace of the other.
I am not saying that theories can never explain discrepancies in observations made by two researchers, but in this case, work was so tightly structured and collectively organized that our lived experiences were largely impervious to the influence of consciousness brought to the shop floor from without, including our own sociological theories! INTERNAL PROCESSES So far I have considered only constructivist explanations for the difference in our experiences-that is, explanations that focus on the relations that Roy and I had to our fellow workers (whether due to habitus, location, or embodiment), or explanations that focus on the theories we used to make sense of what we saw. I now turn to the realist explanations for the differences we observed-that is, explanations that consider our accounts to reflect attributes of the world being studied (rather than products of our theoretical or practical engagement with the site). Like constructivist explanations, realist explanations are also of two types: The first attributes divergence to "internal processes," and the second to "external forces."
Is it possible to explain the shift from despotic to hegemonic regimes of production by reference to processes within the factory? Roy (1952b) did observe internal processes of a cyclical character. Rules would be imposed from above to restrict informal bargaining and collusion, but over time workers would stretch and circumvent the rules until another avalanche of managerial decrees descended from on high. Could such cyclical change explain a secular change over 30 years? It is conceivable that the shift from despotism to hegemony was an artifact of our different placement in the cycle between bureaucratic imposition and indulgency pattern. But this explanation does not work, because I too observed a similar oscillation between intensified rules and their relaxation during my year on the shop floor. So this rules out the possibility that Roy and I were simply at different points in the cycle. Besides, the shift over 30 years cannot be reduced to the application or nonapplication of rules but also involved the introduction of completely new sets of rules regarding the bidding on jobs, grievance machinery, collective bargaining, and so on. Annual cyclical change could not explain the overall shift in the 30 years. We must turn, therefore, to external factors to explain the secular shift to a hegemonic regime.
EXTERNAL FORCES
The shift from despotism at Geer Company to hegemony at Allied Corporation is compatible with a shift reported in the industrial relations literature. The system of internal labor markets (both in terms of bidding on jobs and the system of layoffs through bumping) as well as the elaboration of grievance machinery and collective bargaining became common features in the organized sectors of American industry after World War II. These changes were consolidated by the pattern bargaining between trade unions and leading corporations within the major industrial sec- What do I mean by "external forces"? I use the term "external forces," rather than, say, "external context," to underline the way the environment is experienced as powers emanating from beyond the field site, shaping the site yet existing largely outside the control of the site. These forces are not fixed but are in flux. They appear and disappear in ways that are often incomprehensible and unpredictable to the participants. External context, by contrast, is a more passive, static, and inertial concept that misses the dynamism of the social order.
This brings up another question: From among the myriad potential external forces at work, how does one identify those that are most important? They cannot be determined from the perspective of participant observation alone but, in addition, require the adoption of a theoretical framework for their delimitation and conceptualization. But theory is necessary not just to grasp the forces operative beyond the site; it is also necessary to conceptualize the very distinction between internal and external, local and extra-local. For example, Marxist theory directs one first to the firm and its labor process (the local or internal), and then to an environment (the extra-local or external) composed of markets and states. The "internal" and the "external" are combined within a more general theory of the development of capitalism. In sum, theory is a sine qua non of both types of realist explanation for change between successive ethnographies of the same site. Table 1 assembles the four hypothetical explanations for the discrepancy between Roy's (1952b) and my own account of the Geer/Allied shop floor. Along one dimension I distinguish between constructivist and realist explanations-the former focusing on changes in knowledge of the object (whether due to different relations to the field or alternative theory), and the latter focusing on changes in the object of knowledge (whether these changes are due to internal processes or external forces). The second dimension refers to the distinction between "internal" and "external" explanations of change-between relations constituted in the field and theories imported from outside, or between internal processes and external forces. If there are limitations to Roy's Chicago method, there are also limitations to my use of the Manchester method.10 Even though I still believe that "external forces" offer the most accurate explanation for the discrepancies between our accounts, in hindsight the way I conceptualized markets and states was deeply problematic." I was guilty of reifying "external forces" as natural and eternal, overlooking that they are themselves the product of unfolding social processes. Here I was indeed shortsighted. Markets and states do change. Indeed, soon after I left Allied in 1974 the hegemonic regime came under assault from (1) the globalization of markets (which in fact led to the disintegration of Allied) and (2) the Reagan state's offensive against trade unions. In forging class compromise and individualizing workers, the hegemonic regime made those very same workers vulnerable to such offensives from without. If I had been more attentive to Marxist theory I would have recognized that states and markets change. More than that, I would have noticed that the hegemonic regime sowed the seeds of its own destruction by disempowering the workers whose consent it organized. The hegemonic regime that I saw as the culmination of industrial relations in advanced capitalism was actually on the verge of disappearing! The problem was not with the choice of "external forces" as the explanation of change from Geer to Allied but my failure to take sufficiently seriously the other three elements in Table 1 . I should have deployed "theoretical reconstruction" to recognize possible "internal processes" (elsewhere within the economy or state) that might have produced those "external forces." Furthermore, had I problematized my own embodied participation at Allied I might have appreciated the peculiarities of manufacturing that were being replaced by ascendant varieties of newly gendered and racialized labor 9 Similarly, Becker (1998:89) reduces my revisit to studying the "same problem" under "new conditions." In so doing he misses the distinctiveness of my extended case method. First, I didn't study the same problem but the opposite problem. That is, he ignores my inversion of Malinowski ( (1929) Richards (1939) processes. The lesson here is that revisits demand that ethnographers consider all four elements of Table 1 .
FROM ELEMENTS TO TYPES OF FOCUSED REVISITS
The four elements in Table 1 define reflexive ethnography, that is, an approach to participant observation that recognizes that we are part of the world we study. Reflexive ethnography presumes an "external" real world, but it is one that we can only know through our constructed relation to it. There is no transcendence of this dilemma-realist and constructivist approaches provide each other's corrective.12 Following Bourdieu (1990), I believe that interrogating one's relation to the world one studies is not an obstacle but a necessary condition for understanding and explanation.13 In particular, as ethnographers we are only part of the world we study. That is, we face human limitations on what we can study through participant observation, which makes the distinction between internal and external inescapable. Once again, cross-classifying these two dimensions, we get four possible ways of explaining the discrepancy between an original study and its revisit. It so happens that actual focused revisits tend to emphasize one or another of these four explanations, giving rise to four types as shown in Table 2 . Not only do focused revisits tend to fall into one of four types but each type assumes a quite distinctive modal character.
Type I revisits focus on the relations between observer and participant and they tend to be "refutational." That is to say the successor tends to use the revisit to refute the claims of the predecessor. Such is Freeman's (1983) Type III revisits focus on internal processes, and they tend to be "empiricist." That is, the successor tends to describe rather than explain changes over time. Such is Lynd and Lynd's (1937) revisit to their own first study 12 Abbott ( 
FOCUSED REVISITS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST KIND
The distinguishing assumption of the constructivist revisit is that the site being studied at two points in time does not itself change, but rather it is the different relation of the ethnographer to the site (Type I) or the different theory that the ethnographer brings to the site (Type II) that accounts for the discrepancy in observations. It is our knowledge of the site but not the site itself that changes, in the first instance through refutation and in the second instance through reconstruction. We call these revisits constructivist because they depend upon the involvement or perspective of the ethnographer, that is upon his or her agency. This attack on a foundational classic of cultural anthropology reverberated through 14 This strategy of indicting one's adversaries by stressing their extra-scientific motivation or their nonscientific practices is not confined to the social sciences. In Opening Pandora's Box, Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) show how biochemists, entangled in disputes about "the truth," deploy two types of discourse: an "empiricist" discourse that deals in "the facts," and a "contingent" discourse that attributes "errors" to noncognitive (social, political, and personal) interests. Scientists apply the empiricist discourse to themselves and the contingent discourse to their opponents. We find the same double standards in Type I revisits. The revisitor's research is beyond reproach, while the predecessor's research is marred by flawed field work, by biases due to habitus, location, or embodiment. In these cases of refutation, as for the scientists studied by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), revisitors exempt themselves from such biases or inadequacies in their own field work--but the grounds for such exemption are more presumed than demonstrated. Critics easily turn the tables on the revisitor by playing the same game and revealing his or her biases. the discipline.'" Social and cultural anthropologists regrouped largely in defense of Mead. While recognizing possible flaws in her field work, and tendentious interpretations of her own field notes, they turned the spotlight back on Freeman. Refutation inspired refutation. Critics found his citations of sources opportunistic, they wondered how he (a middle-aged white man) and his wife might have been more successful in discovering the sex lives of female adolescents than the 23-year-old Mead. They accused him of relying on informants who had their own axe to grind, making him appear either more gullible than Mead or simply cynical. They complained that he said little about his own relations to the people he studied, except that he knew the language better than Mead did. They were skeptical of his claim that being made an honorary chief meant that Samoans trusted him more than they did Mead. His critics considered him to have been gripped by a pathological refutational frenzy that lasted from first field work until he died in 2001.
Freeman brought further vituperation upon himself by refusing to offer an alternative theory of adolescence, biological or other, that would explain the data that he had mobilized against Mead. He followed Popper, to whom he dedicated his 1983 book, but only half way. Popper (1962) (Heimans 1988) , and a fictionalized play was produced of this high drama in the academy (Williamson 1996) . change between the time of Whyte's study and her own observations. Boelen's (1992) critique of sociology's iconic ethnography barely rippled the disciplinary waters, in part because ethnography is more marginal in sociology than in anthropology and in part because the critique was poorly executed. Even if Boelen had approached her revisit with Freeman's seriousness, she would have had to confront a sociological establishment mobilized to defend its archetypal ethnography. As a graduate student, and female to boot, she would have been at a severe disadvantage. As Freeman discovered, it is always an uphill task to refute an entrenched study that has become a pillar of the discipline, and in Mead's case, a monument to America's cultural self-understanding. One might say that Freeman had to develop a pathological commitment to refutation if he was to make any headway. In the business of refutation the balance of power usually favors the predecessor, especially if he or she is alive to undermine or discredit the refuting successor.16 The evidence brought to bare in the refutation must be either especially compelling or resonant with alternative or emergent disciplinary powers. Rather than cutting them down to size or trampling them into the ground, it is often easier to stand "on the shoulders of giants," which is the strategy of the next set of revisits-the reconstruction of theory.
TYPE II: RECONSTRUCTION
We have seen how some refutational revisitors, not content to highlight the distorting effects of poorly conducted field work, also claimed that their predecessors imported arbitrary theory at the behest of an influential teacher or as a devotee of a favored school of thought. In the examples above, the revisitors failed, however, to put up their own alternative theory. They pursued the destruction of theory but not its reconstruction. It is reconstruction that distinguishes Type II revisits.
One cannot be surprised that feminist theory is at the forefront of theoretical reconstruction of the classic ethnographies. Although by no means the first to revisit this sacred site, Weiner's is a dramatic reconstruction from the perspective of Trobriand women. Where Malinowski focused on the rituals and ceremonies around the exchange of yams, Weiner dwelt on "mortuary ceremonies," conducted by women after the death of a kinsman, at which bundles of specially prepared banana leaves and skirts (also made out of banana leaves) are exchanged among the female kin of the deceased. While men worked in the yam gardens, women labored over their bundles. These two objects of exchange represented different spheres of power: control of the intergenerational transfer of property in the case of men, and control over ancestral identity in the case of women. Thus, the rituals of death similarly divided into two types: those concerned with reestablishing intergenerational linkages through the distribution of property, and those concerned with repairing one's "dala" identity, or ancestry, by distributing bundles of banana leaves. Women monopolized a power domain of their own, immortality in cosmic time, while they shared control of the material world with men in historical time.
Weiner (1976) committed herself to repositioning women in Trobriand society, and by extension to all societies. Hitherto anthropologists had reduced gender to kinship or seen women as powerless objects, exchanged by men (Levi-Strauss 1969). In taking the perspective of these supposed objects (i.e., in subjectifying their experiences), Weiner showed them to wield significant power, institutionalized in material practices and elaborate rituals. Her revisit, therefore, served to reconstruct a classic study by offering a more complete, deeper understanding of the power relations between men and 16 In her comments as a reviewer, Diane (Gluckman 1961 ) that would be adopted as a mythology of development. Rather than subscribing to a theory of underdevelopment and decline, however, Ferguson refused any theory of history for fear of generating a new mythology. Although there are realist moments to his ethnography, and the data he offers could be reinterpreted through a realist lens, Ferguson replaced Manchester School teleology with an anti-theory that disengaged from any causal account of social change. In other words, his revisit went beyond pure refutation (Type I) to theory reconstruction (Type II), but the new theory is the apotheosis of constructivism, explicitly repudiating the realist endeavor. Constructivism, brought to a head, now topples over.
FOCUSED REVISITS OF A REALIST KIND
To the simpleminded realist, focused revisits are designed specifically to study historical change. We have seen, however, that revisits may never mention history, or mention it only too discount it. Constructivist revisits pretend there is no change, and the differences between predecessor and successor accounts are due to the ethnographers' participation in the field site or to the theory they bring to the site. The revisits I now consider start out from the opposite presumption-that discrepant accounts are due to changes in the world, but as we shall see, they are often modified by considering the effects of the ethnographer's participation and theory. The constructivist perspective brings a needed note of realism to the realist revisit by insisting that we cannot know the external world without having a relationship with it. In what follows, constructivism disturbs rather than dismisses, corrects rather than discounts, deepens rather than dislodges the realist revisit.
I divide realist revisits into two types: Type III revisits, which give primary attention to internal processes, and Type IV revisits, which give more weight to external forces. This is a hard distinction to sustain, especially when the time span between studies is long. Only if the revisit is an empirical description, cataloging changes in a community's economy, social structure, culture, and so on, can a purely internal focus be sus- Sustaining the distinction between "internal" and "external" compels us to problematize it but without relinquishing it. Just as Type I refutational revisits by themselves are unsatisfactory and require incorporation into Type II revisits of reconstruction, so Type III revisits that dwell on internal processes are equally unsatisfactory by themselves, requiring incorporation within Type IV revisits that thematize "external forces." TYPE III: EMPIRICISM A compelling empiricist revisit is hard to find, but Lynd and Lynd's (1937) revisit to their own study of Middletown is at least a partial case. Insofar as they described Middletown's change between 1925 and 1935, they confined their attention to the community, but as soon as they ventured into explanation they were driven to explore forces beyond the community. Without so much as recognizing it, they reconstructed the theory they had used in the first studya reconstruction that can be traced to their own biographies and their changed relation to Middletown. In other words, their revisit, ostensibly an investigation of internal processes, bleeds in all directions into Type I and II constructivist explanations as well as Type IV structuralist explanations.
The first Middletown study (Lynd and Lynd 1929), which I call Middletown I, was most unusual for its time in focusing on social change. Taking their base-line year as 1890, the Lynds reconstructed the intervening 35 years from diaries, newspapers, and oral histories.22 To capture a total picture of Middletown, they adopted a scheme used by anthropologist W. H. R. Rivers that divided community life into six domains: getting a living, making a home, training the young, organizing leisure, religious practices, and community activities. newspapers that had expanded their circulation). The pace of change was greatest in the economy, which set the rhythm for the other domains-leisure, education, and home underwent major changes, while religion and government changed more slowly.
In all realms, Lynd and Lynd (1929) discerned the profound effects of class. The. previous 35 years had witnessed, so they claimed, a growing division between a working class that manipulated physical objects and a business class that manipulated human beings (stretching all the way from the lowest clerical workers to the highest corporate executive). They discovered a growing class divide in access to housing, schooling, welfare, medical services, in patterns of the domestic division of labor, leisure, reading, religious practices, and in influence over government, media, and public opinion. The business class controlled ideology, promoting progress, laissez faire, civic loyalty, and patriotism, while the working class became ever more atomized, bereft of an alternative symbolic universe.
If we should congratulate the Lynds on adopting a historical perspective, we should also be cautious in endorsing their study's content, especially after historian Thernstrom (1964) demolished a similar retrospective history found in Warner and Low's (1947) study of Yankee City. This is all the more reason to focus on the Lynds' revisit to Middletown in 1935, Middletown in Transition, which I call Middletown II.
Robert Lynd returned to Middletown with a team of five graduate students but without Helen Lynd. The team set about examining the same six arenas of life that structured the first book. With the depression, the dominance of the economy had become even stronger, but Lynd was struck by continuity rather than discontinuity, in particular by Middletowners' reassertion of old values, customs, and practices in opposition to change emanating from outside. Lynd documented the emergence and consolidation of big business as a controlling force in the city; the expansion and then contraction of unions as big business fought to maintain the open shop in Middletown; the stranglehold of big business on government and the press; the growth and centralization of relief for the unemployed; adaptation of the family as women gained employment and men lost prestige; the expansion of education; the stratification of leisure patterns; the continuity of religious practices that provided consolation and security.
So much for the Lynds' empiricist account. But there is a second register, an explanation of the changes, interwoven with the description. Capitalist competition and crises of overproduction produced (1) the disappearance of small businesses, making the power of big business all the more visible; (2) uncertain employment for the working class, which was living from hand to mouth; (3) diminished opportunities for upward mobility as rungs on the economic ladder disappeared; resulting in (4) a more transparent class system. The two-class model had to be replaced by six classes. Already one can discern a change in the Lynds' theoretical system: In Middletown I, change came about "internally" through increases in the division of labor; in Middletown II, change was produced by the dynamics of capitalism bound by an ineluctable logic of competition, overproduction, and polarization. The influence of Marxism is clear, but unremarked. Market forces were absorbing Middletown into greater America, the federal government was delivering relief, supporting trade unions, and funding public works, while from distant places came radio transmissions, syndicated newspaper columns, and standardized education. Middletown was being swept up in a maelstrom beyond its control and comprehension.
The Lynds (1937) could not confine themselves to internal processes, but how selfconscious were they of the shift in their theoretical perspective? Two long and strikingly anomalous chapters in Middletown II have no parallels in Middletown I. The first anomalous chapter is devoted to Family X, which dominated the local economy, government, the press, charity, trade unions, and education. Yet Family X was barely mentioned in Middletown I, although its power, (Firth 1936) and to which he returned in 1952. Like the Lynds' in their revisit to Middletown, Firth was not about to deconstruct or reconstruct his own original study. Rather he took it as a baseline from which to assess social change over the 24 years that had elapsed between the two studies. Having constructed Tikopia as an isolated and self-sustaining entity, the impulse to social change came primarily from without. Indeed, Firth arrived just after a rare hurricane-an external force if ever there was one-had devastated the island, causing widespread famine. As a counterpart to the depressions that hit Middletown, the hurricane became Firth's test of the resilience of the social order, a test which for the most part was met. But Firth was more concerned to discern long-term tendencies, independent of the hurricane and the famine it provoked. He emphasized Tikopian society's selective incorporation of changes emanating from without-labor migration to other islands, the expansion of commerce and a money economy, the influx of Western commodities, the expansion of Christian missions, the intrusion of colonial rule. In the face of these irreversible forces of "modernization," the Tikopian social order still retained its integrity. Its lineage system attenuated but didn't disappear, gift exchange and barter held money at bay, residence and kinship patterns were less ritualized, but the principles remained in spite of pressure on land, chiefly power was less ceremonial but also strengthened as the basis of colonial rule. In short, an array of unexplicated, unexplored external forces had their effects but were mediated by the social processes of a homogeneous Tikopian society.
More recent structuralist revisits problematize Firth's assumptions. They examine the contingency of external forces as well as the deep schisms these forces induce within societies. They think more deeply about the implication of the original ethnographers living in the world they study, and even their impact on the world that is revisited.27 25 As Robert Lynd (1939) himself wrote: "The current emphasis in social science upon techniques and precise empirical data is a healthy one; but, as already noted, skilful collection, organization, and manipulation of data are worth no more than the problem to the solution of which they are addressed. If the problem is wizened, the data are but footnotes to the insignificant" (p. 202). Smith (1984) Instead of reconstructing EvansPritchard's original studies, relocating them in their world-historical context, Hutchinson deployed the clever methodological device of comparing two Nuer communities-one in the western Nuer territory that more closely approximated Evans-Pritchard's enclosed world and another in the eastern Nuer territory that had been more firmly integrated into wider economic, political, and cultural fields. Administered by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the West became a bastion of resistance to Islamicization from the North. Still, even there, despite being swept into war, markets, and states, the Nuer managed to maintain their cattle-based society. Exchanging cattle, especially as bridewealth, continued to cement the Nuer, but this was only possible by regulating and marginalizing the role of money. As the Nuer say, "Money does not have blood." It cannot recreate complex kin relations, precisely because it is a universal medium of exchange. Rather than cattle being commodified, money was "cattle-ified." As in the case of bridewealth, so in the case of bloodwealth, cattle continued to be means of payment. In Nuer feuds, cattle were forfeited as compensation for slaying one's enemy. When guns replaced spears or when the Nuer began killing those they did not know, bloodwealth was still retained but only where it concerned the integrity of the local community.
Change may have taken place within the terms of the old order, but nonetheless it was intensely contested. As war accelerated Nuer integration into wider economic, political, and social structures, Nuer youth exploited new opportunities for mobility through education. An emergent class of educated Nuer men, bull-boys as they were called, threatened the existing order by refusing scarring marks of initiation (scarification). Initiation lies at the heart of Nuer society, tying men to cattle wealth and women to human procreation. Thus the newly educated classes were at the center of controversy. Equally, cattle sacrifice was contested as communities became poorer, as Western medicines became more effective in the face of illness and disease, and as the spreading Christianity sought to desacrilize cattle. The SPLA promoted Christianity both to unite the different Southern factions in waging war against the North, and as a world religion to contest Islam in an international theatre. Finally, the discovery of oil and the building of the Jonglei Canal (that could environmentally ruin southern Sudan) increased the stakes, and thus the intensity of war. Indeed, southern Sudan became a maelstrom of global and local forces.
Rather than reifying and freezing "external forces," Hutchinson endowed them with their own historicity, following their unexpected twists and turns but also recognizing Moore and Vaughan's (1994) first task was to reexamine Land, Labour and Diet in the light of the data Richards (1939) herself compiled and then in the light of data gathered by subsequent anthropologists, including themselves. Moore and Vaughan discovered that Bemba women were more resourceful than Richards had given them credit for being-they cultivated relish on their own land and found all sorts of ways to cajole men-folk into cutting down trees. This was Richards' sin of omission-she overlooked the significance of female labor and its power of adaptation. Her second sin was one of commission; namely, she endorsed the obsession of both Bemba chiefs and colonial administrators with the citimene system, an obsession that stemmed from the way the Bemba used shifting cultivation to elude the control of their overlords, whether that control be to extract taxes or tribal obligations. So it was said by Bemba chiefs and colonial administrators alike-citimene was responsible for the decay of society! Richards not only reproduced the reigning interpretation but gave ammunition to successive administrations, which wished to stamp out citimene. Land, Labour and Diet was forged in a particular configuration of social forces and extant knowledge, and then contributed to their reproduction. As a particular account of Bemba history it also became part of that history.
The conventional wisdom Richards (1939) propagated-that Bemba society was in a state of "breakdown"-was deployed by colonial and postcolonial administrations to justify their attempts to transform Bemba agriculture. Even as late as the 1980s, the Zambian government's agrarian reforms assumed that citimene was moribund. It responded to the Zambian copper industry's steep decline by encouraging miners to return "home" (i.e., to rural areas), where they were offered incentives to begin farming hybrid maize. Moore and Vaughan (1994) show how it was this return of men (not their absence) that led to impoverishment as the farmers now demanded enormous inputs of female labor, delivered at the expense of subsistence agriculture and domestic tasks. In particular, this compulsory labor caused women to wean their children prematurely, leading to higher infant mortality. It was not the cash economy, citimene, or male absenteeism that threatened Bemba livelihood, as Richards and conventional wisdom had it, but the regulation of female labor by male workers returning from the Copperbelt. This is a most complex revisit. On one hand, Moore and Vaughan (1994) did to Richards (1939) precisely what the Lynds did not do to themselves and Hutchinson did not do to Evans-Pritchard-namely, to locate the original study in the social context of its production, recognizing its contribution to the history the successor study uncovers, drawing out the link between power and knowledge. On the other hand, unlike Freeman (1983), who also proposed ways in which Mead shaped the world she described, Moore and Vaughan did not sacrifice history. They were still able to offer an account of the transformation of Bemba agriculture from the 1930s, taking their reconstruction of Richards's classic study as point of departure. But here is the final paradox: Moore and Vaughan did not consider the ways their own analysis might have been one-sided, governed by specific feminist and Foucauldian assumptions, and thereby contributed to discourses that would shape the Bemba world of future revisits. While they located Richards in the world she produced, they did not locate themselves in their own relation to the Bemba. Indeed, they write all too little about their own field work, their own interaction with the Bemba. In restoring Richards to history, ironically Moore and Vaughan placed themselves outside history.
Moore and Vaughan (1994) did not take the final step toward grounding themselves because they did not engage in any self-conscious theorizing. They had no theory to help them step outside themselves. As in the indeterminacy of outcomes in Nuerland, the openness of the future stems from a refusal of theorization, beyond orienting propositions about gender, power, and knowledge. Both these revisits contrast vividly with my own structuralist study in which I viewed the hegemonic organization of work as the "end of history" and had no conception of reversal or alternative paths. Where I froze external forces to produce a structural overdetermination, Hutchinson (1996) and Moore and Vaughan (1994) left external forces in the hands of the gods to produce a structural underdetermination. My error was the opposite of theirs, but the source was the same-an ignorance of the processes behind the external forces. I did not examine the processes behind state transformation or market globalization; Hutchinson did not study the strategies of war in the Sudan or the World Bank's development schemes; Moore and Vaughan did not attempt an analysis of the declining copper industry or the Zambian state's strategies of rural development. The revisits to the Nuer and the Bemba reversed the determinism of their predecessors, whether it be the static functionalism of the one or imminent breakdown of the other. These anthropologists' aversion to explanatory theory led to an empiricism without limits, just as my failure to take Marxist theory sufficiently seriously led me to reification without possibilities. In all cases, the problem was the undertheorization of external forces. We need to deploy our theories to grasp the limits of the possible and the possibilities within limits.
EXTENDING THE REVISIT TO ALL ETHNOGRAPHY
We are now in a position to extend the analysis of the focused revisit to other dimensions of ethnography. But first to recap: The focused revisit entails a focused dialogue between the studies of the successor and predecessor. From this dialogue I have elucidated four explanations for the divergence of accounts of the "same" site at two points in time. I distinguished revisits based on whether they were constructivist (i.e., focused on the advance-refutation or reconstruction-of "knowledge of the object") or whether they were realist (i.e., focused on historical change in the "object of knowledge").
In the constructivist class, I distinguished Type I from Type II revisits. Type I revisits focus on a claimed distortion in the original study brought about by the relation of ethnographer to the people being studied. These revisits aim to show how misguided the first study was, thereby discrediting it without substituting an alternative interpretation. The peculiarity here is refutation without reconstruction. The Type II revisit focuses on the theory brought to bear by the original ethnographer and replaces it with an alternative theory. In neither case is the revisit itself exploited for its insight into historical change, which is the focus of Types III and IV. Type III revisits concentrate on internal processes of change. Such a confinement proves possible only in so far as there is no attempt to explain change, that is only if we limit ourselves to describing it. Finally, Type IV revisits admit external forces into the framework of explanation. Here ignorance of those external forces-their appearance, and disappearance, and their dynamicsleads either to structural determinacy or, more usually, to historical indeterminacy, to which even the effects of the original study may contribute.
I have argued that the nine revisits discussed here tend to fall into, rather than across, the four types. This suggests that the dimensions I used to define the four types have a certain robustness with respect to the actual practice of focused revisiting. Still the distinctions are far from watertight. Take the more imposing distinction between constructivism and realism. While our constructivist revisits seem to be able to suspend historical change, that precisely is their shortcoming. On the other hand, I have shown how realist revisits continually face constructivist challenges, underlining the dilemmas of participating in a world while externalizing and objectifying it. If there is bleeding across the constructivist-realist dimension, the boundary between internal and external is a veritable river of blood. Refutation easily leads to reconstruction, and empiricism to structuralism. However fluid and permeable the line between internal and external may be, the distinction itself is nonetheless unavoidable. First, theorizing cannot be reduced to the ethnographer's relation to the field. Theorizing cannot begin tabula rasa with every new field work-it's not feasible for ethnographers to strip themselves of their prejudices. Even if it were feasible researchers wouldn't get far as a scientific collectivity if they insisted always on returning to ground zero-they necessarily come to the field bearing theory. Simply put, the mutually enhancing dialogue between participant observation and theory reconstruction depends on the relatively autonomous logics of each. Second, everything cannot be a topic of study: An ethnographer must distinguish the arena of participant observation from what lies beyond that arena. The necessity of the demarcation between internal and external is therefore practical-ethnographers are part of the world they study, but only part of it-but it is represented and justified in terms of the theories they deploy.
In short, reflexive ethnography recognizes two dilemmas: (1) There is a world outside ourselves (realist moment), but ethnographers can only know it through their relation to it (constructivist moment); and (2) ethnographers are part of that world (internal moment), but only part of it (external moment). There is no way to transcend these dilemmas, and so reflexive ethnography must consider all four moments, even if in the final analysis it concentrates on only one or two. The practitioners of other sociological methods have no reason to gloat-the same dilemmas also apply to them, they are just less glaring and less invasive. Reflexive ethnography clarifies and anticipates the methodological challenges facing all social science. Ethnographers can say to their scientific detractors: "De te fabula narratur!"
Having demonstrated the principles of reflexive ethnography at work in the focused revisit, which is still rather esoteric for sociologists, can these principles be applied to other aspects of field work? Can ethnography be conceptualized more broadly through the lens of the "revisit"? In addition to the focused revisit, I delineate five other types of revisit-rolling, punctuated, heuristic, archeological and valedictory. Here my intent is to show how sociologists have begun to deploy these in their ethnographies, thereby gesturing to, and even embracing, history, context, and theory.
FIELD WORK-THE ROLLING REVISIT
I begin with the mundane routines of field work, the elementary form of ethnography. Conventionally, field work is regarded as a succession of discrete periods of "observation" that accumulate in field notes, later to be coded, sorted, and analyzed when all the "data" are in. Every "visit" to the field is unconnected to previous and subsequent ones, so in the final analysis visits are aggregated as though they were independent events. In the reflexive view of field work, on the other hand, "visits" to the field are viewed as a succession of experimental trials, each intervention separated from the next one to be sure, but each in conversation with the previous ones. In this conception, field work is a rolling revisit. Every entry into the field is followed not just by writing about what happened but also by an analysis in which questions are posed, hypotheses are formulated, and theory is elaborated-all to be checked out in successive visits. In this rendition, field notes are a continuous dialogue between observation and theory.
In his appendix to Street Corner Society, Whyte (1955) describes the detached process of accumulating data, writing down everything, and sorting it into folders, but he also writes of the conversation between theory and data. Thus he writes of the influence that the anthropologist, Conrad Arensberg, had in encouraging his focus on social interaction among particular individuals and how that interaction reflected the social structures in which they were embedded. Arensberg provided the theoretical frame that Whyte was to so famously elaborate. Accordingly, Whyte's field notes became filled with detailed events and conversations between particular individuals. His epiphany came when he discovered the link between performance at bowling and position within the gang and later when he related mental illness (e.g., Doc's dizzy spells) to the disruption of customary roles. Reflexive field work, in short, calls attention to realist as well as constructivist moments. It demands that the field be understood as always in flux, so that the rolling revisit records the processual dynamics of the site itself. But, more than that, the rolling revisit demands attention to disruptions of the field from outside, which shift its character and take it off in new directions. Still, remember that this field-in-flux can be grasped only through theoretical lenses and through the ethnographer's interactions with those he or she studies. 
DIGGING UP THE PAST-THE ARCHEOLOGICAL REVISIT
If the heuristic revisit moves forward in time, from the earlier study to the later one that it frames, the archeological revisit moves backward in time to excavate the historical terrain that gives rise or gives meaning to the ethnographic present. If not strictly a revisit-since there is no reference study known ahead of time-it is a common technique for giving historical depth to ethnography. In the archeological revisit, multiple sources of data are used, whether retrospective interviews, published accounts, or archival documents. One could simply triangulate and aggregate all the historical data from different sources as though they measured a singular and fixed reality. This, however, would violate the rules of reflexivity, which demand disaggregating "data" to reflect their relations of production, namely (1) relations between observers and participants, and (2) It is often said that handing back a finished product is the responsibility of the ethnographer. That may be so, but the valedictory revisit also serves a scientific function. This final engagement with the people one studies, confronting them with one's own conclusions, deepens both constructivist and realist insights into the world we study. It may be traumatic-both for the participant and the observer-but through pain the cause of reflexive ethnography advances.
WHAT ANTHROPOLOGY CAN LEARN FROM SOCIOLOGY
The postcolonial world has driven anthropologists back to their early historical and macro perspectives that they lost in the era of professionalization. As I have tried to argue here, in its inception these moves beyond field work in time and beyond the field site in space were invariably positive. Now, however, these moves could be taking a selfdefeating turn. As anthropologists release their subjects from conceptual confinement in their villages, they mimic their migratory circuits. Bouncing from site to site, anthropologists easily substitute anecdotes and vignettes for serious field work, reproducing the cultural syncretism and hybridity of the peoples they observe (Hannerz 1996) .
As they join their subjects in the external world, anthropologists have also all too easily lost sight of the partiality of their participation in the world they study. They begin to believe they are the world they study or that the world revolves around them. Behar's (1993) six-year dialogue with her single subject, Esperanza, fascinating though it is, brackets all concern with theoretical issues and, thus, fails to grapple with change in Mexican society. Her view of reflexivity re-duces everything to the mutual orbiting of participant and observer. It dispenses with the distinction between internal and external: first, in the constructivist dimension where anthropological "theory" is reduced to the discourse of the participant, and second, in the realist dimension where there is nothing beyond "multi-sited" ethnography. Furthermore, the very distinction between realism and constructivism folds into an autocentric relation of ethnographer to the world. Geertz (1995) , whose recounting of the quandary of the changing anthropologist in a changing world introduced this paper, similarly fails to address the dilemmas of revisits, dissolving his reflections into a virtuoso display of literary images. In his hands ethnography becomes a mesmeric play of texts upon texts, narratives within narratives. By the end of its cultural turn, anthropology has lost its distinctive identity, having decentered its techniques of field work, sacrificed the idea of intensively studying a "site," abandoned its theoretical traditions, and forsaken its pursuit of causal explanation. Theory and history evaporate in a welter of discourse. Anyone with literary ambition can now assume the anthropological mantle, making the disrupted discipline vulnerable to cavalier invasion by natives and imposters. Once a social science, anthropology aspires to become an appendage of the humanities. Although this is only one tendency within anthropology, it is significant and ascendant-a warning to ethnographersociologists as they emerge from their own wilderness.
As the examples above have shown, ethnographer-sociologists are following anthropologists out of seclusion-more cautiously but more surely. As I have said, within sociology, ethnography has had to wrestle with a positivist legacy which was also reductionist-a tradition that reduced the external to the internal (theory induced from observation, context suspended to insulate the micro-situation) at the same time that it privileged realism over constructivism (the world is purely external to us). As anthropologists veer toward the center of the universe looking out, ethnographer-sociologists are coming from the margins and looking in. Ethnographer-sociologists may be latecomers to history and theory, but therein lies their advantage. For as they leave their guarded corner they are disciplined by the vibrancy of sociology's comparative history and theoretical traditions. This dialogue within sociology and with social science more broadly will help the ethnographer-sociologist retain a balance between constructivism and realism. Such, indeed, are the benefits of backwardness! The ethnographer-anthropologist, on the other hand, has no such disciplinary protection and, unless new alliances are forged, faces the onrushing world alone.
The divergent orbits of ethnography in sociology and anthropology reflect the histories of our disciplines, but they are also responses to the era in which we live. The spatially bounded site, unconnected to other sites, is a fiction of the past that is no longer sustainable. Under these circumstances, what does it mean to undertake a revisit, especially a focused revisit? What is there to revisit when sites are evanescent, when all that's solid melts into air? How, for example, might I revisit Allied today-30 years after my first encounter-if I cannot find it where I left it? One possibility, all too popular, is to simply study myself. I could trace my own research trajectory from Chicago to communist Hungary to postcommunist Russia, reflecting on the world-historical shifts of the last 30 years. Moving beyond such solipsism, I might follow my work-mates, as Macleod (1995) did with his two gangs. We might call this a biographically-based revisit.31 Or I could study the homeless recyclers that now, hypothetically, inhabit the vacant lot that used to be Allied. We might call this a place-based revisit. Or I could go off to South Korea where, again hypothetically, Allied's new engine division can be found. We can call this an institution-based revisit. These different types of revisit might all coincide if we were studying the same enclosed village or the old company town, but with globalization they diverge into three profoundly different projects. The only way of connecting them is to look upon each as a product of the same broad historical process, examining, for example, the implications of the shift in the United States from an industrial to a service economy. This could interconnect biographies of workers and their children, the redeployment of place, and the fleeing of capital to other countries.
But we can no longer stop at the national level. Today the recomposition of everyday life is also the product of transnational or supranational processes. A comprehensive revisit might involve following individual biographies, institutional trajectories, and the reconstitution of place, locating them all in regional, national, and also global transformation. Verdery (2003) conducted such a complex of nested revisits in her ethnography of decollectivization in Aurel Vlaicu--a Transylvanian village she studied under communism and then again during the postcommunist period. She followed individual kin members, specific groups (insiders and outsiders), the village land restitution committee, and different economic organizations (state farms, cooperatives, and individual production), all in relation to the transformation of property relations, which itself only makes sense within the local political economy, the national law of privatization, the conditionalities of the World Bank, and the IMF, and the global spread of market fundamentalism. With so many parts of the world dissolving, reconfiguring, and recomposing under the pressure of their global connections and, at the same time, other parts stagnating because of their global disconnections, ethnographic revisits with a global reach become irresistible. The more irresistible is the global revisit, however, the more necessary is theory to track and make sense of all the moving parts.
Privatization and market transition push ethnography to global extensions, which require not only theoretical frameworks for their interpretation but also historical depth. The only way to make sense of global forces, connections, and imaginations is to examine them over time. In other words, global ethnographies require focused, heuristic, punctuated, and particularly archeological revisits to excavate their historical terrains (Burawoy, Blum et al. 2000) . Approaching a global ethnography of Allied today would require resituating the company of 1973-1974 in its global market, in the global connections between the engine division and other divisions, in the global imagination of its workers and managers-before I could undertake a parallel investigation. This is how Nash (2001) turned a focused revisit into a global ethnography of the Zapatista movement. Every summer between 1988 and 1993 she returned to Chiapas-the site of her own 1957 study-with a team of students. While acknowledging the shortcomings of the descriptive anthropology extant in the 1950s, namely the tendency to insulate communities from their determining context, she nonetheless partially recuperated that insulation as a political struggle to defend autonomy. In the early 1990s, such defensive maneuvers were no longer effective. In the face of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the rollback of land reform through privatization, the erosion of subsistence agriculture, the attrition of state welfare, and the violation of human rights, Chiapas autonomy could no longer be defended by withdrawal and insulation. It required aggressive political organization and the development of an indigenous movement of national focus and global reach. Nash demonstrated that without history to ground it and theory to orient it, global ethnography is lost.
The time is nigh for the sociologist-ethnographer to come out of hiding and join the rest of sociology in novel explorations of history and theory (Adams, Clemens, and Orloff forthcoming). We should not forget that Marx, Weber, and Durkheim grounded their history, as well as their theory, in an ethnographic imagination, whether of the factories of nineteenth-century England, the religious bases of economic behavior, or the rites and beliefs of small-scale societies. Foucault founded his originality in a virtual ethnography of prisons and asylums, De Beauvoir and her daughters set out from the privatized experiences of women, while Bourdieu launched his metatheory from the villages of Algeria. Thus, not only does reflexive ethnography require the infusion of both theory and history, but theory and historical understanding will be immeasurably advanced by the conceptualization and practice of ethnography as revisit. Michael Burawoy is Professor of Sociology at the University of California-Berkeley. He has done ethnographic field work in Zambia, Chicago, Hungary, and Russia.
